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ABSTRACT
This paper is dedicated to the empirical exploration of the welfare effect of expectations and 
progress per se. Using ten waves of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, a panel 
household survey rich in subjective variables, the analysis suggests that for a given total stock 
of inter-temporal consumption, agents are more satisfied with an increasing time-profile of 
consumption: they seem to have a strong “taste for improvement”. This contributes to qualify 
the “Easterlin paradox” that income growth does not make people happy.
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People have a “gestalt” notion of an ideal distribution of outcomes in time (Camerer and 
Loewenstein 2004).
1. INTRODUCTION 
Do past and future events affect current feelings of utility? After decades of tests and 
discussions of the discounted utility model, with the hindsight of field data and experiments, 
the assumption of separability between different sequences of utility has been breached.
Beyond hyperbolic discounting, many anomalies regarding the relation between time, 
decision and utility are now well established. In particular, “behavioural economics” (e.g. 
Camerer and Loewenstein 2004) acknowledge the possibility of inter-temporal spillovers of 
utility (i.e. the anticipated or retarded influence of events on individual well-being). By 
accepting this proposal, one is using a notion of utility that is not defined uniquely as a value 
attached ex ante to a decision, by comparison with other choices, but as an experience, 
specifically a mental state that includes emotions1. 
How do lags and leads enter into current utility? Past consumption or past utility is most often 
taken to exert a negative impact over current satisfaction because of benchmarking effects 
                                               
1 I refer to Kahneman et al. (1997) for the discussion of the difference between decision-utility and experienced-
utility.
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such as adaptation2 (Frederick et al. 2002) and reference point effects3. As opposed to the rich 
literature devoted to adaptation, the positive continuing effect of past consumption has been 
rarely documented, except as memory utility (Kahneman 2003). Studies in child psychology 
could certainly provide illustrations of the benefits of an early accumulation of an initial 
“stock” of happiness. A recent paper by Graham and Oswald (2006) develops the notion of 
“hedonic capital” as a stock on which individuals can draw to smooth bad life-shocks 
Concerning the effect of the future, the literature has recently accumulated evidence of 
“anticipatory feelings” (Caplin and Leahy 2001) such as dread, savouring, hope and anxiety. 
The idea is that agents experience in advance the utility of future events (e.g. surgery 
operation or having dinner with a glamorous partner). The intuition dates back to the origin of 
economic thinking. “three distinct ways are recognisable in which pleasurable or painful 
feelings are caused: (1) by the memory of events, (2) by the sensation of present events, (3) by 
the anticipation of future events” (Bentham, quoted by Loewenstein 1987, p 667). However, 
future events can also exert a negative contrast effect if one is impatient to enjoy an expected 
event that, by contrast, makes the present dull. A prisoner about to be released from jail is 
likely to experience this type of negative anticipatory feelings.
The consequence of inter-temporal spillovers of utility is that the time profile of events 
matters. In particular, both adaptation and anticipatory feelings mean that individuals are 
more satisfied at each moment if they see their dynamic consumption trajectory as a rising 
one. Indeed, with aspirations based on past consumption they enjoy consuming more than 
yesterday, and because of savouring they enjoy the perspective of a future improvement. In 
sum, they enjoy progressing4. 
                                               
2 Adaptation is sometimes declined in two versions: hedonic treadmill and satisfaction treadmill. “Hedonic 
treadmill” refers to adaptation to a latent pleasure variable (say income), whereas “satisfaction treadmill” 
invokes adaptation to a certain level of satisfaction, i.e. the notion of a changing aspiration level (in other terms, 
satisfaction itself becomes an argument of satisfaction).
3 Helson (1947) defines adaptation as the diminished responsiveness to a repeated or continued stimulus. In a 
model of rational addiction à la Becker and Murphy (1988), adaptation means that current utility is a decreasing 
function of the stock of accumulated past consumption.
4 If agents expect adaptation to take place in the future, it constitutes an additional argument for preferring 
increasing sequences.
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This paper tries to provide empirical evidence of this phenomenon. It illustrates the fact that 
acknowledging or expecting an improvement in one’s material situation is a motive of life 
satisfaction. Its main claim is that, ceteris paribus, for a given stock of cumulated inter-
temporal consumption, people are happier when they experience a progression in their 
standard of living than when they consume the same stock, but without a progression. The 
principal challenge of this work is to show that these results reflect of the impact of progress 
per se. 
1.1 Why isn’t it trivial?
Isn’t it trivial that progressing or expecting to progress influences happiness? Although this 
idea is very intuitive, it is in contradiction with some basic principles of economic thinking. 
First, classically, economists consider that individuals maximize their inter-temporal utility, 
but they assume (for simplicity) that each period’s experienced utility depends only on the 
contemporaneous consumption flow (separability of time sequences). 
Second, when agents are supposed to be impatient (when they make choices that maximize 
their inter-temporal utility), they are supposed to value the flows of current consumption at a 
higher rate than the same flow of consumption available in, say, two years’ time. In other 
words, they have a preference for the present. This is completely at odds with the assumption 
of savouring and of a preference for increasing time profiles of consumption. As pointed by 
Frederick et al. (2002), Caplin and Leahy (2001) and Köszegi (2005), anticipated utility gives 
rise to apparently negative rates of discounting of the future.
Third, consumer theory considers that agents optimise their consumption over their life cycle, 
which leads them to smooth their consumption profile; if they are not financially constrained, 
they borrow and save in order to equalize the marginal utility of consumption at each period, 
but this most often does not lead to a rising time-path of consumption.
Hence, the welfare influence of pure informational phenomena such as expectations are not 
usually acknowledged by standard economic modelling, which does not allow expected future 
improvement to influence immediate welfare directly.
It is important to stress that the savouring effect that is studied here differs from the obvious 
consumption smoothing whereby agents anticipate, in their current consumption level, the 
higher income due for tomorrow (e.g. Browning and Collado 2001). The focus of the paper is 
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not on the inter-temporal allocation of material consumption, but on the inter-temporal 
externality of satisfaction,that is, on the “direct effect of information on pleasure and pain” 
(Loewenstein 2006, p 313).
1.2 Why does it matter?
Should economists bother taking into account inter-temporal transfers of utility? There are 
many arguments in favour of doing so. One of them is that inter-temporal utility spillovers 
complicate the understanding of what a rational behaviour should be and constitutes a 
challenge for the theory of decision-making5. Consider for example, the notion of the 
satisfaction treadmill, which lies at the foundation of the so-called Easterlin paradox. The idea 
is that habituation effects destroy the benefit of growth. This is because of the deleterious role 
of aspirations: “Material aspirations increase commensurately with income, and as a result, 
one gets no nearer to or farther away from the attainment of one’s material goals, and well-
being is unchanged” (Easterlin 2003, p 11180). 
The issue is provocative and important for both theoreticians and policy-makers. On the 
theoretical side, agents who underestimate the habituation effect that sweeps away part of 
their expected income utility should not be represented as rational utility maximizers, but
rather as myopic inter-temporally inconsistent persons. They take decisions based on false 
expectations so that their experienced utility turns out to be different (lower) from their 
expected utility6. On the political side, the market economies of social democracies are based 
                                               
5 Inter-temporal spillovers seem to question the validity of the consumer model by calling in heterodox 
assumptions about agents’ preferences or behaviour, but the recognition of such behaviour can help to explain a 
series of puzzling phenomena such as the manipulation of information (strategic learning and remembering). 
People who derive utility from their beliefs or representations about the future can rightly choose to “put their 
head in the sand”. Hence, they will not take medical tests in order to avoid thinking about the possibility of being 
ill or will not prepare their retirement in order to keep away from the idea of old age and death. Governments 
and doctors can also carefully filter the information they give to their patients or citizens in order to maximize 
their welfare (Caplin and Leahy 2003). More generally, habituation, loss-aversion and anticipatory feelings 
contribute to explain many anomalies and apparently time-inconsistent behaviour, such as nominal price 
rigidities, the departure of wages from productivity, or the equity premium puzzle (Camerer and Loewenstein 
2004, Frederick et al. 2002).
6 As put by Easterlin (2001, p 481), “People […] project current aspirations to be the same throughout the life 
cycle, while income grows. But since aspirations actually grow along with income, experienced happiness is 
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on a pro-efficiency-cum-growth consensus. If growth turns out not to make people happy, 
then other types of social organizations could be preferable. The implications of the Easterlin 
question thus loom large, questioning the need for paternalism and the choice of capitalism.
The Easterlin paradox is based on adaptation (i.e. the influence of past consumption on 
current utility). However, taking into account the emotional impact of future prospects can 
bring about different conclusions and reconcile adaptation with growth. Indeed, with a “taste 
for improvement”, working hard for money or any other goal, even in a framework with 
adaptation, turns out not to be a self-defeating project.
This short discussion illustrates the complexity of the interlocked dynamics of income, 
aspirations, expectations and satisfaction. This paper does not try to estimate a structural 
model of these effects; instead, it tries to estimate a reduced form of the ex post relation 
between past or expected progress and satisfaction, based on a retrospective view. 
1.3 Existing empirical evidence
Thus far, the empirical evidence about inter-temporal spillovers has mainly been collected 
from field studies or experiments. (e.g. Loewenstein and Sicherman 1991, Loewenstein and 
Prelec 1991, Loewenstein et al. 2003, Brocas and Carillo 2003 and 2004, Camerer et al.
2004). A famous and intuitive experiment by Loewenstein and Prelec asked people to choose 
over different sequences of dinners at more or less fancy restaurants; the results revealed a 
strong preference for improving sequences (in terms of meals’ quality). Recently, a new type 
of evidence has been provided by experiments in neuroscience and more specifically in 
“neuro-economics” (Camerer et al. 2004). For instance, an experiment by Berns et al. (2006) 
uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to relate brain activity with anticipations and 
dread. They observe a significant relationship between individual differences in the measure 
of dread in the brain activity and individual differences in inter-temporal choice behaviour 
(Loewenstein 2006).
By contrast, survey evidence is scarce. Concerning adaptation, di Tella et al. (2007) use the 
German GSOEP panel data and find signs of total habituation to income (but not to status); 
                                                                                                                                                  
systematically different from projected happiness. Consequently, choices turn out to be based on false 
expectations”. 
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they show that the effect of past income on current satisfaction tends to fade away with time. 
Stutzer (2004), using a Swiss survey, finds that higher income aspirations reduce individual 
utility. He uses the “income evaluation question” (in your circumstances, what income would 
you find sufficient?) as a proxy for aspirations. Aspirations of agents are then found to depend 
on the average income of their community and on their own income, conformingly to van 
Praag’s earlier finding. One of the most remarkable contributions of the Leyden school is 
indeed the unveiling of a “preference drift”, an evaporation of the ex post effect on 
satisfaction of a rise in individual income (see van Praag 1971 and 1991 and van Praag and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonnell 2004). 
Concerning spillover effects from the future, Clark et al. (forthcoming) have shown that 
individuals start being less happy one year before they experience job quits, layoffs and 
unemployment. Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell devote a chapter of their book to “The 
Impact of Past and Future on Satisfaction”, showing that both past remembered and future 
expected income influence current financial satisfaction. Frank and Hutchens (2004) observe 
the increasing wage profiles of commercial airline pilots and intercity bus drivers and show 
that in both cases, earnings grow more rapidly than productivity over time. They interpret this 
as a sign of a preference for rising consumption profiles, coupled with other behavioural 
assumptions such as lack of willpower and comparison effects, that make this type of forced 
saving desirable when individuals are unable to defer present consumption.
The next section presents the data and the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the results, 
section 4 interprets them, and section 5 concludes.
2. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This work is based on the waves 5 to 13 of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS), a database containing many attitudinal questions related to satisfaction, expectations 
and past changes in individuals’ living standards. These waves correspond to years 1994, 
1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. This is panel data, so it is possible to 
follow the dynamics of expectations and satisfaction of the same individuals during nine 
consecutive rounds. The panel nature of the data also allows the control of (at least some of 
the) unobserved individual heterogeneity. Finally, the Russian environment is a guarantee of 
sufficient variance in the dynamics of income, expectations and satisfaction. Essentially, in 
Russia, aggregate income and subjective well-being decline from 1994 and resume after the 
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devaluation of August 1998 and onwards. Behind these aggregate evolutions, it is well-known 
that the Russian context imposes a high degree of variability and uncertainty upon Russian 
households (Senik 2004, Eggers et al. 2004).
The main demonstrandum of this paper is the pure effect of progression on welfare: ceteris 
paribus, given their total stock of real expenditure, agents are happier with an increasing time-
profile of consumption. One thus needs to identify the welfare effects of past and expected 
variations in individual consumption. The next sub-section presents the attitudinal questions 
that are used to proxy these effects.
2.1 Subjective variables as proxies for welfare
Let Ct, Ct-1, C
a
t, C
a
t+1 be respectively the flows of current consumption at time t, past 
consumption at time t-1, consumption at time t as expected in t-1, and future expected 
consumption at time t+1 as expected at time t. The RLMS data contains several subjective 
variables that correspond to these magnitudes. 
The EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT subjective variable (Do you think that in the next 12 months 
you and your family will live better than today or worse?) is taken to proxy the difference 
between current and future expected living standard (Cat+1 - Ct), while the PAST IMPROVEMENT
question (Tell me, please: How has the financial situation of your family changed in the last 
12 months?) proxies subjective past volution, (Ct-Ct-1). The current consumption of the 
household Ct is proxied using the LOG REAL EXPENDITURE of the year, which is based on a 
detailed and exhaustive reporting of all consumption items by the household. Concerning the 
past level of consumption Ct-1, one would like to have a variable representing “remembered 
utility” (in the terminology of Kahneman et al.), for example, a question that would ask “what 
was your living standard last year?” However, as there is no such variable in the dataset, I use 
LAGGED REAL EXPENDITURE as a proxy for Ct-1. 
Eventually, the objective is to assess the effects of these variables on general LIFE 
SATISFACTION (To what extent are you satisfied with your life in general at the present time?). 
I also use self-assessed HEALTH (Tell me, please: How would you evaluate your health?) as a 
proxy for experienced utility. The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in the 
Appendix.
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2.2 Empirical strategy
The objective is to isolate the pure welfare effect of expectations7 and change per se (i.e. the 
relation between LIFE SATISFACTION and indicators of progress such as EXPECTED 
IMPROVEMENT or SITUATION HAS IMPROVED, ceteris paribus). To this end, one must 
overcome the difficulty that stems from the intertwined effects of aspirations, adaptation and 
expectations. Suppose for instance that my current positive expectations make me happier 
today but create higher aspirations that render it more difficult to satisfy me tomorrow. Then, 
what is the total dynamic effect of positive expectations on inter-temporal happiness? 
In order to elucidate this question, an intuitive way is to take a retrospective view. The idea is 
to capture the net result of these complex dynamics of expectations, progress and satisfaction 
by asking the following question: “after several years, for a given stock of inter-temporal 
consumption, do people who have more often experienced or expected a progression in their 
living standard have a higher score of cumulated happiness than (otherwise identical) people 
who have consumed the same stock but without expected or actual progression?” Hence, one 
needs to estimate a relationship between an aggregate indicator of progression and an 
aggregate score of Life Satisfaction, controlling for the total stock of real consumption of the 
individual over the considered period.
A technical question is what period to consider (i.e. how to aggregate the time series). It is 
tempting to “collapse” the whole period 1994-2004 in order to have more hindsight. 
However, this would not allow controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity. An 
obvious problem is indeed that happiness and expectations are probably endogenous to some 
idiosyncratic invariant personal feature such as “personality”. Subjective variables are 
particularly subject to anchoring effects that make interpersonal comparisons difficult. For 
                                               
7 A delicate issue is whether my experienced utility in t is affected by my expected experienced utility in t+1 or 
by the expected change in my standard of living. In other words, what are anticipatory feelings about: the future 
event itself or the future contentment brought by the event? The future flow of utility or its argument? Although 
the question is interesting, there is no means to decide upon it, at least with the material on which this paper is 
based. Indeed, the question “Do you think that in the next 12 months you and your family will live better than 
today or worse?” mixes the impact of expectations with their content. On the other hand, false beliefs à la 
Easterlin concern flows of utility, not of consumption (i.e. people imagine that getting richer will make them 
happy, but it does not).
Page 10 of 28
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
10
example, more extraverted persons may be systematically more satisfied and more optimistic 
than others, hence the “spurious” relation between the two variables. Supposing that 
personality is time invariant and that it can be approximated by an additive effect, the usual 
method is to introduce fixed effects8. 
In order to keep the time dimension of the data so as to introduce individual fixed effects, I 
thus divide the observations into three blocks of three years9. I then aggregate the stock of 
consumption and the score of Life Satisfaction inside each block. The equation to estimate is 
(1): 
CUMULATED LIFE SATISFACTION ib = a0 + a1. CUMULATED CONSUMPTIONib + a2. INDICATOR OF 
PROGRESS ib  + a3 .X it + a4. It  +  uit  +  ei      (1)
where b=1 for years 1994-1996, b=2 for years 1997-2000, and b=3 for years 2001-2004,  
CUMULATED LIFE SATISFACTIONib is the sum of life satisfaction scores of individual i over the 
years of block b,  CUMULATED CONSUMPTIONib is the sum of consumption flows of individual i 
over block b, ei is a time invariant individual fixed effects, Xit is a vector of socio-
demographic controls, It are time dummies, and uit is a white noise. These three sets of 
variables are measured at the last year of each time block, so that t =1996 if b=1, t = 2001 if b 
= 2 and t = 2004 if b = 3.
The estimation of equation (1) is thus run on a sample of 2808 individuals * 3 years (i.e. 8424 
observations). 
                                               
8 Subjective variables are ordinal variables; hence, in principle, they are improper to simple differences. Two 
solutions are then available: (i) either collapse the satisfaction and expectations variables into categories 
(satisfied/not satisfied, situation will improve/deteriorate) and run a conditional fixed effect logit model, which 
imposes an important loss of information; (ii) or ignore the ordinal nature of the variables and use classic panel 
models. Surprisingly, after a series of papers that cautiously respected the ordinal nature of subjective variables, 
economists started to go back to linear models, considering after Ferrer-i-Carbonnel and Frijters (2004) that 
introducing fixed effects was of primary importance. In this paper, I adopt the second approach, but I check that 
the results are robust to the first one.
9 I have done the same exercise collapsing the time dimension into two periods of five years; the results are 
identical.
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In terms of INDICATOR OF PROGRESS, I consider alternatively four indicators. They measure 
respectively the number of times inside each time block that an individual declares expecting 
an improvement, expecting a stable situation or expecting a deterioration in the material 
situation of her family. I also measure an objective indicator of progression (i.e. the number of 
times the real household income of an individual has increased during the period). All these 
indicators can take discrete values from 0 to 3.
This specification does not solve all the problems. Another important caveat is that happiness 
and financial expectations can be endogenous to some unobserved variable (omitted variable 
problem). A solution is then to instrument expectations. In addition, there is the suspicion that 
happiness influences expectations rather than the opposite (reverse causation problem). 
People who are unhappy at a certain point of their lives could well have a bias towards 
pessimistic expectations of income for instance. On the contrary, people who are satisfied or 
going though a good period of their lives could well be more optimistic. Instrumentation also 
solves part of this problem. On the other hand, as long as the causality does run from 
expectations to happiness, one should not mind the existence of a reverse causality too. The 
objective is not to exclude that happiness causes optimistic expectations, but only to assess 
whether the reverse is true. 
As it is difficult to instrument the aggregate score of expected progress, I use a different 
specification: I regress current Life Satisfaction over instrumented current expectations, 
controlling for socio-demographic variables, time dummies and individual fixed effects.
As an additional robustness test, in order to be sure of  dealing with ex post experienced utility 
instead of ex ante decision utility (in which case the results would be trivial), I alternatively 
use self-assessed HEALTH (Tell me, please: How would you evaluate your health?) instead of 
LIFE SATISFACTION as the endogenous variable of the above regressions. 
3. RESULTS
The empirical analysis shows that the time profile of consumption seems to have a welfare 
impact per se. Instrumenting expectations and questioning the notion of life satisfaction do 
not alter this result. 
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3.1 The importance of progressing
I start with the estimation of equation (1), which tries to answer the following questions: with 
hindsight, for a given stock of total cumulated consumption over three consecutive periods, 
how does the fact of having nourished positive (resp. negative) expectations feed into 
cumulated happiness, and how does the fact of having experienced a rising income profile 
affect cumulated happiness? This exercise thus tries to capture the welfare effect of the 
perceived and objective time profile of individuals’ living standard.
Table 1 displays the estimation of equation (1), specifically the regressions of CUMULATED 
LIFE SATISFACTION scores of the periods 1994-1996, 1998-2001 and 2002-2004 over 
CUMULATED EXPENDITURE in the same periods, an INDICATOR OF CUMULATED PROGRESSION in 
one’s living standard during the same periods, and other controls measured at the last year of 
each block (1996, 2001, 2004).
Not surprisingly, total CUMULATED REAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE exerts an important 
impact on CUMULATED LIFE SATISFACTION. Then, controlling for this variable, column 1 
shows the positive welfare impact of the number of periods that individuals objectively 
experienced an increase in their real household income (symmetrically, aggregate happiness 
decreases with the number of periods of declining living standard). Table A1 in the Appendix 
confirms this result using individuals’ subjective past evolution. It shows that, ceteris paribus, 
the more often people have felt that their financial situation had improved (resp. deteriorated),
the higher (resp. lower) their cumulated ex post satisfaction. Subjective past stability has a 
much lower impact on cumulated satisfaction compared to past improvement or deterioration.
Turning to subjective expectations, Table 1 suggests that the more often individuals have 
nourished positive expectations, the higher their total cumulated happiness score (column 2). 
One additional period of positive expectations increases cumulated happiness by 0.546, 
knowing that the cumulated happiness score over three years varies from 0 to 15 with an 
average of 6.9 and a standard deviation of 0.76. Expecting a stable living standard (column 3) 
is also a factor of cumulated happiness but by a much lower extent. Conversely, the more 
often individuals have expected a deterioration in their living standard, the lower their 
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cumulated happiness score (column 4). However, expecting an improvement exerts an impact 
of a larger absolute magnitude than expecting stability or a deterioration10. 
Hence, controlling for the total stock of real consumption over three years, there seems to be a 
positive relation between income mobility, both past and expected, and individual total 
happiness. In other words, for a given amount of consumption over time, the time-profile 
matters: individuals have a preference for increasing sequences of consumption.
                                               
10 Of course, one cannot compare the effect sizes as if they were based on equal quantitative changes of material 
circumstances. First, the variables are qualitative; they capture the feeling of respondents that things have 
“improved” or “worsened”, but not the extent to which they have. Moreover, in Tables 1 and 3, the variables are 
defined as the number of times an individual experiences or expects a progression/ deterioration/stability of his 
material living standard. Hence, the important point is the asymmetry between negative and positive change. 
This could be misleading if negative shocks were of a much larger magnitude than positive shocks. However, 
there is no reason to believe so. In particular, since 1998, the Russian economy has been on a strong growth 
trend, so incomes have been on the rise (in average).
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Table 1. Happiness and Consumption Dynamics
Fixed Effects OLS of CUMULATED LIFE SATISFACTION
-1 -2 -3 -4
NB PERIODS WITH HOUSEHOLD INCOME RISE 0,089***
[0.034]
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF IMPROVEMENT 0.546***
[0.041]
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF STABILITY 0.106***
[0.028]
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF DETERIORATION -0.385***
[0.033]
LOG TOTAL EXPENDITURE 0,168*** 0.152*** 0.168*** 0.151***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Observations 8284 8214 8214 8214
Number of persons 2808 2808 2808 2808
R-squared overall 0,229 0,254 0,232 0,249
Log likelihood -14844 -14532 -14653 -14561
Controls: age, age square, number of children, working status, marital status, time dummies. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Regression of cumulated LIFE SATISFACTION SCORES of the periods 1994-1996, 1998-2001 and 2002-2004 over 
CUMULATED EXPENDITURE and CUMULATED INDICATORS OF IMPROVEMENT in the same periods and other controls 
taken at the last year of each block (1996, 2001, 2004).
Before addressing the problem of omitted variables using instrumentation (in section 3.3), I 
have tried to rule out a possible (sceptical) interpretation of Table 1, namely that some 
unobserved variable (beyond personality traits) that is shared across optimistic, happy and 
reportedly healthy people is driving the findings. It is true that Happiness, Expectations and 
Health are correlated11. I thus try to verify that that the relation between progression (actual 
and expected) and life satisfaction is robust to the situation, trajectory or features of 
individuals. 
The main suspicion is that people tend to extrapolate the trends that they have experienced in 
the past. This implies that people who have experienced a past improvement tend to have 
positive expectations and be happier, whereas those who have experience negative outcomes 
                                               
11 The correlation table is the following:
Happy Health Expectations
Happy 1.0000
Health 0.1970 1.0000
Expectations 0.3671 0.2031 1.0000
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in the past tend to expect that the same evolution will happen in the future. If so, Table 1 is 
not illustrating the effect of expected change on happiness but simply the effect of past 
experience. In order to explore this issue, Table 2 presents the regression of current LIFE 
SATISFACTION over current EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT, controlling for real expenditure and the 
usual controls, over three different samples of individuals: the whole sample (column 1), the 
sub-sample of individuals who estimate that their situation has improved as compared to 12 
months ago (column 2), and the sub-sample of people who think that their situation has 
worsened or remained unchanged (column 3). Table 2 shows that the effect of EXPECTED 
IMPROVEMENT remains positive and significant whatever the past evolution of the agent. 
Hence, the effect of EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT on LIFE SATISFACTION does not just reflect the 
past experience of individuals.
Table 2. The impact of expectations does not depend on past evolution
Fixed Effects OLS Regressions OF LIFE SATISFACTION
-1 -2 -3
All Situation improved Situation did not improve
EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT 0.343*** 0.162** 0.200***
[0.021] [0.080] [0.047]
LOG REAL EXPENDITURE 0.128*** 0,019 0.084***
[0.012] [0.060] [0.027]
Observations 17018 1771 5489
Number of persons 2551 1084 2114
R-squared 0,128 0,071 0,037
Log likelihood -19917 -1228 -5261
Controls: age, age square, nb children under 7 in household, nb children from 7 to 18 years old in household, 
working status, marital status, year dummies.
Dichotomized variable: expect improvement: yes or no.
The number of observations is smaller in columns 2 and 3 because variable past improvement is only available 
during four waves, from 2001 to 2004.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
I have also checked that the relation between progress and life satisfaction holds for other 
partitions of the sample (e.g. richer versus poorer). Hence, the relation is not driven only by 
the individuals who experience positive (or negative) affects in the three dimensions (health, 
happiness and expectations).
Page 16 of 28
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
16
3.2 Health and expected improvement
Another worrying question is the following: does the variable LIFE SATISFACTION really 
measures ex post experienced utility and not ex ante expected utility? In the latter case, there 
would be nothing surprising about the fact that expected improvement raises expected future 
utility. By contrast, if declared LIFE SATISFACTION reflects (at least partly) experienced 
happiness, then the observation that this variable is influenced by expectations is not trivial. In 
other words, the question is whether declared LIFE SATISFACTION measures a feeling rather 
than a value judgement. 
How can one separate decision-utility from experienced-utility? Consider the definition of 
health in the Constitution of the World Health Organization in 1946: “Health is a state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity”; this description is almost indistinguishable from the definition of well-being (i.e. 
experienced utility). De facto, self-assessed health is highly correlated with declared 
satisfaction (R2=0.19). Since most specialists would gree that health is certainly an 
experience rather than a judgement, it is thus interesting to use the SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH
variable, which is available in the RLMS survey, as a proxy for the feeling of satisfaction12
and to check whether it depends on past and expected progress. 
I thus estimate an equation similar to (1), in which I replace LIFE SATISFACTION with SELF-
ASSESSED HEALTH. 
                                               
12 The important point here is not that subjective health be unbiased but that it reflects an experience, a feeling, 
rather than an abstract judgement.
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Table 3. Health and consumption dynamics
Fixed effects OLS regressions of CUMULATED SELF-DECLARED HEALTH
-1 -2 -3 -4
NB PERIODS WITH HOUSEHOLD INCOME RISE 0,016
[0.019]
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF IMPROVEMENT 0.095***
[0.024]
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF STABILITY 0,024
[0.016]
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF DETERIORATION -0.101***
[0.019]
LOG TOTAL EXPENDITURE 0,005 0,002 0,005 0
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214
Number of persons 2808 2808 2808 2808
R-squared within 0,044 0,047 0,044 0,049
log likelihood -10148 -10137 -10147 -10128
Controls: age, age square, number of children, working status, marital status, time dummies. 
Regression of CUMULATED HEATH SCORES of the periods 1994-1996, 1998-2001 and 2002-2004 over CUMULATED 
EXPENDITURE and CUMULATED INDICATORS OF IMPROVEMENT in the same periods and other controls taken at the 
last year of each block (1996, 2001, 2004).
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
As shown by Table 3, SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH13 is sensitive to one’s expected consumption 
trajectory. Positive and negative expectations have an impact of similar magnitude (columns 2 
and 4 in Table 3) although negative prospects have a slightly more important impact. This 
contrasts with the regression of LIFE SATISFACTION, where the number of periods with 
EXPECTATIONS OF IMPROVEMENT had a larger impact than the number of periods with 
EXPECTATIONS OF DETERIORATION. Table A2 in the Appendix shows that, ceteris paribus,
people who have more often experienced an improvement (resp. a deterioration) in their 
financial situation also reach ex post higher (resp. lower) scores of cumulated subjective 
health.
Hence, SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH can be considered as a proxy of LIFE SATISFACTION but seems 
to have its own profile. In particular, the stress generated by negative anticipatory feelings 
                                               
13 It may come as a surprise that the coefficients on total expenditure and objective income rise are not 
significant, but this is a classical result that income is not a significant variable in the regression of subjective 
health.
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seems to be particularly harmful for subjective health. Stability has a much lower impact on 
subjective health than it has on subjective life satisfaction. Beyond these particular feature of 
self-assessed health, the lesson of Tables 1 and 3 is that expected and observed progression 
can be considered to influence experienced-utility and not only decision-utility. 
3.3 Ruling out the “omitted variable” interpretation
When assessing the welfare effect of expected and perceived improvement, how can one be 
sure not to evaluate the impact of a hidden variable? In this section I concentrate on the 
influence of expectations. 
The classical response to the omitted variable problem is instrumentation: one needs to think 
of a variable that influences EXPECTATIONS directly, but only influences LIFE SATISFACTION
through EXPECTATIONS. Stutzer (2004) uses aggregate income variables and contact with 
neighbours as instruments for aspirations. In a similar spirit, I use the typical income of one’s 
professional group at the next period to instrument EXPECTATIONS. I thus regress real income 
(yt+1) on age, gender, industry, diploma, occupation and regional price level in period (t+1). I 
then use the PREDICTED INCOME of the next period (ŷt+1) as an instrument, which is what 
agents should expect if they had perfect foresight. (I check that indeed agents have quite 
reasonable forecasts about the evolution of their living standard; see section 4.2). Lastly, I 
verify that instrumented expectations do influence self-declared happiness.
The system of equations to estimate is thus the following:
 PREDICTED INCOME: yt = b0 + b1.(age, gender, education, occupation, region,
industry)t + it (2.1)
 EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT : Eit = e0 + e1. ŷi t+1 +  vit  +  i      (2.2)
 LIFE SATISFACTION: LSit = d0 + d1.Cit + d2. Êit + d3 .Xit + d4. It  +  it  +  i   (2.3)
where  it, vit and it are white noises, and i and i are individual fixed effects. 
Beyond the usual assumptions about the error terms, this system is based on the assumption 
that PREDICTED FUTURE INCOME ŷi t+1 does not influence LIFE SATISFACTION at period t directly 
but only via EXPECTATIONS, which means that the right-hand side variables that are used to 
estimate ŷit+1 should also not influence LIFE SATISFACTION directly but only via 
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EXPECTATIONS, except those who are also present in the final regression of LIFE SATISFACTION
(i.e. age and gender). This is all the more credible as these magnitudes are measured one 
period ahead (t+1) from current life satisfaction (t) 14. One also has to avoid the risk of perfect 
multi-collinearity between the right-hand side variables in the estimation of ŷit+1 and the right-
hand side variables of the regression of Life Satisfaction, in particular, the socio-demographic 
variables that are designated under the term Xit. As shown in Table 4, Xit includes age, age 
square, the number of children under 7 years old and between 7 and 18 years old, the working 
status and the marital status of the individuals. This exclusion relation should ensure that this 
risk is avoided.
                                               
14 A possible limitation of the instrument is the high volatility of the Russian economy. In addition, the relation 
between skills and rewards has been greatly perturbated since the beginning of the Transition. However, this does 
not mean that most individuals cannot forecast their future situation, even though it does not correspond to what 
they could aspire to in another context or in the pre-Transition context.
Another (opposite) problem is that predicted income (i.e. the instrumental variable) might capture the higher job 
security somebody is experiencing in t, even though the predicted future income is based on the typical income of 
the individual based on his circumstances as of t+1. I have checked that restricting the sample to individuals who 
change job at the next period (5346 observations) does not alter the result (the coefficient on predicted future 
income is 0.13 (0.035) and the coefficient on instrumented expectations is 1.13 (0.37). The idea is that if the 
individual changes job, her expectations are regressed on the new characteristics of the job in t+1 and not on her
job in t. Nonetheless, it is still possible that the reason why an individual expects to change job at time t+1 is 
likely to make her happy already in the current period t. An ideal instrument would capture something exclusively 
related to the future and not to the current circumstances of the individual…
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Table 4. Two Stage Least Square Regression of LIFE SATISFACTION 
EXPECTATIONS Instrumented by PREDICTED INCOME for the Next Period
Second stage regression of LIFE SATISFACTION
Coef. Std. Err. t
EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT 0,81 0,20 4,04
Log real expenditure 0,09 0,04 2,25
Age -0,01 0,01 -1,5
Age square 0,00 0,00 2,76
Nb child<7 -0,05 0,02 -2,93
Nb child 7<n<18 -0,04 0,01 -2,85
Working 0,18 0,03 5,58
Never married -0,03 0,04 -0,85
Divorced -0,10 0,04 -2,56
Widow -0,12 0,04 -3,34
_cons -0,57 0,47 -1,23
Number of obs 18290
Nb clusters 2801
F( 10,  2800) 96,98
Prob > F 0,00
R-squared 0,04
Root MSE 1,05
First-stage regression of EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT
Coef. Std. Err. t
PREDICTED FUTURE INCOME 0,12 0,02 6,25
Log real expenditure 0,20 0,01 24,15
Age -0,04 0,00 -14,7
Age square 0,00 0,00 11,64
Nb child<7 0,02 0,01 1,65
Nb child 7<n<18 -0,05 0,01 -5,33
Working -0,12 0,02 -7,02
Never married 0,00 0,03 0,05
Divorced 0,00 0,03 -0,09
Widow 0,03 0,02 1,34
_cons 1,22 0,18 6,79
Number of obs 18290
nb clusters 2801
F( 10, 18279) 156,76
Prob > F 0,00
R-squared 0,08
Adj R-squared 0,08
Root MSE 0,94
Regression with robust errors, cluster (individual). Instrumented:  Expected
improvement. In the first-stage regression, Expected improvement in period t is regressed 
on individual  circumstances at period (t+1).
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The results of Table 4 show that the predicted income of the next period does influence 
current expectations and that instrumented expectations, in turn, do influence Life 
Satisfaction. Hence, one cannot reject the assumption that the relation between EXPECTED 
IMPROVEMENT and LIFE SATISFACTION is not spurious.
The same doubt can be cast on SUBJECTIVE HEALTH: do optimistic persons feel more healthy 
or is there some unobserved reason why they feel both more optimistic and more healthy? 
Likewise for the regression of LIFE SATISFACTION, I try to establish the direction of the 
causality by instrumenting EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT on future PREDICTED INCOME, assuming 
that PREDICTED INCOME only influences SUBJECTIVE HEALTH via expectations. The result of 
the 2SLS estimation confirms that there is some causality going from expectations to health: 
in the first stage estimation of EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT, the coefficient of PREDICTED INCOME
is 0,032, with a T statistics of 4; in the second stage estimation of HEALTH, the coefficient of 
instrumented EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT is 0,949, with a T statistics of 2,4 (controlling for the 
usual variables). Hence experienced utility, as proxied by SELF-DECLARED HEALTH, seems to 
be influenced by expectations.
4. INTERPRETATION. PROGRESSION AND SISYPHUS
This set of results suggests the following conclusions: Remembered and expected events exert 
an important impact on current experienced utility. They influence Life Satisfaction as well as 
self-assessed Health. Declared Life Satisfaction thus expresses moment-utility, which 
according to Kahneman (2003) is best suited for constructing a measure of objective 
happiness.
4.1 Sisyphus
Ceteris paribus, people are happier when they observe or expect a positive change. As put by 
Camerer and Loewenstein (2004, p 26) “A majority of subjects prefer sequences that improve 
over time. Preferences for improvement appear to be driven in part by savouring and dread, 
and in part by adaptation and loss-aversion” because “improving sequences allow decision 
makers to savour the best outcomes under the end of the sequence. With losses, getting 
undesirable outcomes over with quickly eliminates dread. Adaptation leads to a preference 
for improving sequences because people tend to adapt to ongoing stimuli over time and to 
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evaluate new stimuli relative to their adaptation level […]. Loss aversion intensifies the 
preference for improvement over deterioration ”.
This preference for improvement in the context of adaptation is a reminder of the legend of 
Sisyphus. As a punishment inflicted by Zeus, Sisyphus was doomed to push a boulder uphill 
over and over again, knowing that as soon as the rock would reach the top it would 
immediately fall back. In a similar way, man seems to be doomed to progress: progressing 
does not always make him much happier but not doing so would condemn him to an even 
more cruel fate. Transposed in the field of economics, the idea is that lucid agents rationally 
enjoy the perspective of a progression in their material situation, be it only because this is the 
only means to overcome the deleterious work of adaptation.
4.2 Happiness out of illusion?
Another interpretation of the taste for progression could be that agents underestimate 
adaptation and overestimate their future welfare15, as suggested by Easterlin (2001). Partisans 
of economic growth could reply that even so, people who strive for money, although they 
may find out that the increase in their material standard is not as satisfying as expected, may 
nonetheless have enjoyed the perspective. However, this raises a series of issues. First, how 
much value can we attach to growth if its welfare effect is due to agents’ misprediction of 
their future utility? More importantly, when agents acknowledge that their expectations were 
too high, how much disutility does this generate? To what extent does the ex post disutility of 
disappointment compensate the flow of anticipatory feelings that was felt ex ante? 
Conversely, is there a possibility of a double dividend, one from the imagination and one 
from the realization of the event?
Some answers to these questions are provided by Table 1, which suggests that in spite of 
adaptation and possible forecasting errors, the net inter-temporal effect of having positive 
expectations is to increase cumulated happiness. Moreover, the data shows that agents make 
quite reasonable predictions about their future standard of living. In the fixed effect OLS 
                                               
15 The literature is rich of examples of mistaken forecasts of future welfare. Loewenstein (1987) for instance, 
reports the experience of people whose degree of anxiety about a future surgery operation turns out to be much 
more intense that the pain they actually suffer during the operation. 
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regression of PAST IMPROVEMENT at period t (How has the financial situation of your family 
changed in the last 12 months?), the coefficient of EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT at period t-1 (Do 
you think that in the next 12 months you and your family will live better than today or worse?)
is positive, important and significant at the 1% level. Hence, the data do not validate the 
assumption that agents are not lucid about their future prospects, and more precisely that they 
fail to predict the way they will appreciate their consumption level in the future.
Finally, the data do not validate the assumption of complete adaptation. To test the extent of 
adaptation to income, I use the same method as Di Tella et al. (2007), namely I introduce 
HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE at time t, t-1, t-2 and t-3, in the regression of LIFE SATISFACTION, 
controlling for the usual socio-demographic variables. I do not find evidence of a strong 
adaptation effect. The coefficients on the lagged variables are not significant. Hence, the data 
do not support the assumption of a strong, and a fortiori complete, adaptation.
In summary, expectations are not completely misled; they are consistent with agents’ ex post
evaluation of their situation, which in turn influences Life Satisfaction. One can conclude that 
agents are not completely mistaken when they rejoice at the prospect of a future improvement 
in their living standard. Their anticipatory feelings are not totally compensated by an ex post
dissatisfaction.
4.3 A built-in disposition?
Camerer and Loewenstein go as far as claiming that “people have a “gestalt” notion of an 
ideal distribution of outcomes in time”, which means that trying to progress is something like 
a built-in mechanism, a basic instinct. This observation finds an echo in the psychological
corpus, in particular the so-called tellic theories. 
First, having aspirations as such is recognized as being good for one’s happiness. 
“Dispositional optimism” for instance (i.e. “one’s characteristic thoughts about the future”) is 
considered by many psychologists as a correlate of happiness (Diener et al., 1999). Cantor 
and Sanderson (quoted by Diener et al, p 284) note that “having goals provides a sense of 
personal agency and a sense of structure and meaning to daily life”. Emmons (1986, quoted 
by Diener et al, p 285) reports that “positive affect and a higher life satisfaction are 
associated with past fulfilment of goals and with having valued goals, independent of past 
success”. Pomerantz et al. (quoted by Diener and Lucas 2000, p 60) also claim that “people 
with more goals that they consider very important have higher life satisfaction, self-esteem 
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and positive affect”. As a contraposée, not trying to progress, not having aspirations is often 
considered by psychologists as a sign of depression or illness.
Second, the mere fact of moving towards one’s goals is also recognized as a source of well-
being. Michalos (1985) notes that “the process of moving towards one’s aspirations may be 
more important to well-being than the end-state of goal attainment. Thus people with high 
aspirations and low current outcomes may be satisfied as long as they are making adequate 
progress towards their goal”. According to Emmons (1986, quoted by Diener and Lucas, 
2000, p 57) “happiness results more from the pursuit of a goal than from the attainment of a 
goal”. 
Some authors attribute these observations to anthropologic considerations. They see the 
attempt to progress as a built-in mechanism specific to humanity. Frank and Hutchens (2004, 
p 555) for instance, note that the biological model of human nervous system creates the 
condition of sensitivity to change and deviation rather than to level. It is also tempting to look 
at the improvement instinct as a feature selected by evolution16.
Last, a philosophical interpretation is a more optimistic version of Sisyphus: Descartes 
thought that self-esteem is the basis of happiness. Therefore, progressing, while as 
painstaking as pushing Sisyphus’ boulder, would make man happy by generating self-esteem 
or the pleasure that derives from contemplating a valuable goal.   
5. CONCLUSION: BACK TO THE EASTERLIN PARADOX
This paper has illustrated the existence of anticipatory feelings and the preference for 
improving sequences of consumption. Raising the incomes of all may not increase the 
happiness of all, but expecting a financial improvement seems to be a motive of well-being 
per se, beyond the obvious effect of consumption smoothing. 
To be sure, this pro-growth argument may not be decisive; in particular it does not take into 
account the negative externalities of growth. Similar effects could also probably be evidenced 
                                               
16 Of course, it could be argued that evolutionism is based on competition and that it is competition that forces 
individuals to progress, in spite of their preference for leisure, but then the question of why people engage into 
competition has to be addressed.
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in other domains, and it would be interesting to compare the relative impact of material 
improvement versus progress in other fields. 
However, unveiling the role of expectations sheds light on the Easterlin paradox. There seem 
to be several channels relating income growth with well-being. The first most obvious one is 
of course the direct positive effect of consumption. The second and third negative channels 
are social comparisons and adaptation. Last, the fourth channel is the positive impact of 
expectations. 
The net effect of these four channels may turn out to be deceptively small if these effects 
more or less compensate each other. This would explain the Easterlin paradox. Hence, before 
concluding that income growth does not make people happy, it is worth decomposing the 
general relation between GDP growth and Life Satisfaction, especially if the relative effect of 
these channels depends on the macroeconomic and institutional features of the economy. 
An assumption to explore is indeed that the positive welfare impact of expectations is higher 
in certain contexts. Senik (2004 and 2007) showed that expected income based on the 
observation of one’s professional peers has a particularly strong welfare impact in more 
mobile and uncertain economies (e.g. Transition countries). The current paper extends this 
result to expected income in general. It recalls that growth is one of the important ingredients
of national welfare.
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